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There is a large volume of research showing that emotions have relevant effects on decision-making. We
contribute to this literature by experimentally investigating the impact of four specific emotional states—
joviality, sadness, fear and anger—on risk attitudes. In order to do so, we fit two models of behaviour
under risk: the expected utility model and the rank dependent expected utility model, assuming several
functional forms of the weighting function. Our results indicate that all emotional states mitigate risk
aversion. Furthermore, we show that there are some differences across gender and participants’ experience
in laboratory experiments.
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, economists tend to emphasize the role of rationality and to overlook that
of emotions in the decision-making process.1 In the last two decades there has been a
large volume of research showing that emotions do have relevant effects on decision-
making. Loewenstein (2000) argues that emotions (or visceral factors, in his terminology)
play a role in three different manifestations of an individual’s life. In particular, emotions
affect people’s bargaining behaviour and their intertemporal choices (such as saving
attitudes), and enter into their decision-making under risk and uncertainty. The latter is
the object of investigation in the present work.
Loewenstein and Lerner (2003, p. 620) distinguish between expected emotions, which
consist of ‘predictions about the emotional consequences of decision outcomes’, and
immediate emotions, which are ‘experienced at the time of decision making’. Even though
we cannot rule out the possibility that expected emotions play a role, in this work we
focus on immediate emotions and investigate whether temporary emotional states,
experimentally induced by film clips, affect risk preferences.
Empirical research in psychology and, more recently, in economics has demonstrated
that affect can somewhat influence individual risk preferences. Two conflicting theories
can be distinguished in this research area. On the one hand, Isen and Patrick (1983)
introduced the mood maintenance hypothesis (MMH), which holds that positive affect
induces risk-averse behaviour, while negative affect leads to risk-seeking behaviour. On
the other hand, there is the affect infusion model (AIM), proposed by Forgas (1995),
which suggests the exact opposite effects. Some authors (e.g. Kliger and Levy 2003; Zhao
2006) find empirical support for the MMH, while other scholars (e.g. Arkes et al. 1988;
Yuen and Lee 2003; Chou et al. 2007; Grable and Roszkowski 2008) find evidence in
favour of the AIM. There are also studies that end up with mixed results. Williams et al.
(2003), for instance, show that while unhappy managers are significantly less risk-
seeking, happy managers are not more likely to seek risk. Drichoutis and Nayga (2013)
report that both positive and negative moods increase risk aversion. Finally, in an
experiment inducing joy, fear and sadness under non-existent, low and very high financial
stakes, Treffers et al. (2012) find that, compared to a control group that did not receive
any emotion manipulation, sadness leads to more risk aversion only if the financial stakes
© 2016 The London School of Economics and Political Science. Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road,
Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA
Economica (2018) 85, 305–328
doi:10.1111/ecca.12209
are non-existent or low; none of the induced affects influences risk preferences in the
high-stake treatments.
The experimental study presented in this paper builds on this strand of literature. Yet
our experimental design is novel in a number of important respects.
First, we consider discrete emotions, namely joviality, sadness, fear and anger. With
some exceptions (such as Lerner and Keltner 2001; Kugler et al. 2012; Treffers et al.
2012; Guiso et al. 2013), most previous studies follow a valence-based approach to
affects and contrast affective states of different valence, that is, ‘positive’ versus
‘negative’. Grouping affects can generate perverse effects in that affective states of the
same valence (e.g. sadness, fear and anger) may have conflicting influences on risk
preferences, which can even cancel out one another (see, for example, Raghunathan and
Pham 1999).
Second, we use salient monetary incentives, whereas most of the existing studies in
this area provide small financial incentives (if any) to experimental subjects.2 In their
review articles on the impact of financial incentives on choices, Camerer and Hogarth
(1999) and Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) observe that incentives have the largest effect in
individual decision-making studies. We can verify whether the documented impact of
affect on risk attitudes will survive the introduction of salient monetary incentives.
Third, in contrast to all former experiments, we implement a within-subject design in
the sense that we measure, and compare, individual risk preferences both before and after
affective states are manipulated. This gives our study an important advantage because it
prevents the confounding effect of heterogeneity in preferences to disturb the effect of
emotions on willingness to take risk.3
A further important novelty of this paper lies in the way attitude to risk is measured.
Specifically, we follow Hey (2001) and elicit risk preferences by presenting participants
with 100 pairwise choice problems between two different lotteries. Previous economic
studies measure risk preferences mainly looking at people’s choices when faced with
multiple price lists (MPLs).4 The main advantage of an MPL is that it is easy to explain
to subjects and to implement. Additionally, it is incentive-compatible provided that only
one decision is randomly selected for payment (Azrieli et al. 2012). However, an MPL
has several disadvantages. For instance, Andersen et al. (2006) remark that it (i) elicits
only interval responses rather than point ones, (ii) allows for multiple switching points,
thus leading to potentially inconsistent decisions, and (iii) may be susceptible to framing
effects. Recently, Bosch-Domenech and Silvestre (2013) find that MPLs suffer from
‘embedding bias’, that is, the removal of some pairs at the beginning and/or end of the
list yields a decrease in risk aversion.5 These problems are overcome by the risk
preferences elicitation method that we use here because such a method does not require a
unique switching point, nor does it need point responses, to infer risk attitudes and to
estimate parameters. Inconsistent behaviour can be described either by a given preference
functional with some error or by a shifting preference functional (e.g. Hey 2001).
Eliciting preferences through 100 pairwise choice questions enables us to collect several
observations from each experimental subject and, consequently, to estimate precisely the
participants’ risk attitudes and how they vary, if at all, with the emotional state.
To our knowledge, this would be the first attempt to use a thorough experimental
design—departing from past works in the ways outlined above—to study the impact of
four specific emotional states on risk preferences. We use the same 100 choice problems
as Hey (2001). These problems are performed twice—before and after the affect
induction, so that the total number of problems faced by each subject is 200. The four
affective states (joviality, sadness, fear and anger) are induced using short film clips.6
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Subjects participate either in one of the treatment groups (where the induction of only
one of the four emotional states takes place) or in a control group (where a neutral affect
film clip is shown). The inclusion of a control group enables us to be confident that the
changes (if any) in risk preferences after the participants watched the film clip are a direct
result of the emotion manipulation rather than changes attributable to potential
confounding factors such as experimenter demand effects (Charness et al. 2012). We
check the efficacy of the affect induction procedures using the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule (PANAS-X, Watson and Clark 1999; see Krohne et al. 1996 for a
validated translation of the PANAS into German).
Previous literature shows that women are more risk-averse than men (see the surveys
by Eckel and Grossman 2008; Croson and Gneezy 2009). Moreover, conventional
wisdom and previous research from psychology indicate that women are more
‘emotional’ than men (e.g. Croson and Gneezy 2009, pp. 451–2 and references therein).
Croson and Gneezy (2009) suggest that gender differences in risk attitudes may relate to
differences in emotional reactions to risk. To date, however, little is known about the
(potentially) different effects of emotions on male and female risk preferences (some
noteworthy exceptions are Lerner et al. 2003; Fessler et al. 2004; Fehr-Duda et al.
2011).7 Herein, we use our experimental data to determine whether there are gender
differences in the impact of joviality, sadness, fear and anger on risk preferences.
To further deepen the knowledge of the matter, we also explore whether there are
differences in the effect of the four considered emotions on risk-taking depending on
previous participation in laboratory experiments, which we call experience. While there is
some evidence regarding how experience in one experiment may impact willingness to
take risk in later experiments (e.g. Jamison et al. 2008; Chuang and Schechter 2015), to
the best of our knowledge, nobody has investigated the impact of emotions on risk
preferences distinguishing between experienced and inexperienced subjects. Levin et al.
(1988) posit that previous experience in laboratory experiments may help people to focus
more on the main part of the experiment (in our case, the lottery choice tasks), and to pay
less attention to aspects that are peripheral to the decision task (in our case, emotions).
Following this line of reasoning, one should expect the experienced subjects’ risk
attitudes to be less affected by emotions than the inexperienced subjects’ risk attitudes.
Our data, and the information stored in our database, enable us to assess whether or not
this prediction is correct.
To estimate the role of joviality, sadness, fear and anger on risk-taking, and to
determine whether there are differences according to gender and subjects’ laboratory
experience, we fit two preference functionals: the expected utility and the rank dependent
expected utility, assuming several functional forms of the weighting function. We control
for (i) heterogeneity between individuals by allowing the parameters of the model to vary
between subjects, and (ii) heterogeneity within individuals (inconsistency of choices over
repetitions) by means of a Fechnerian stochastic error term. Fitting different choice
models of behaviour under risk using different functional forms serves us to identify
(statistically) which of the fitted models is able to represent the data best. We adopt this
approach because we want to avoid that misspecifications of the functional form bias the
results.
When considering the entire sample, our results indicate that all the manipulated
emotions lead to less risk-averse behaviour. We detect differences across gender: male
risk preferences are influenced by sadness, while female risk propensity is affected by
joviality. Both male and female risk attitudes are increased by fear. We find that past
participation in experiments also matters in that joviality impacts on both the
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inexperienced and experienced participants’ risk attitudes, whereas fear affects the
inexperienced (but not the experienced) participants’ risk attitudes. The influence of
sadness and anger on risk attitudes, on the other hand, is found not to depend on the
participants’ experience.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the experimental design and
procedures. Section II describes the econometric model. Section III verifies if the emotion
induction has been effective, and reports the results about the changes in risk attitudes.
Section IV summarizes the main findings of the study and offers concluding remarks.
I. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) and conducted in the
experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena (Germany).
The participants, undergraduate students from the Friedrich-Schiller University of Jena,
were recruited using the ORSEE software (Greiner 2004).
The experiment was divided into two identical parts, separated by the emotion
manipulation. Each part included a questionnaire about feelings, and the main
experimental task aimed to measure the participants’ risk attitudes. In what follows, we
will first describe the methods that we used to elicit risk preferences, to induce emotions
and to measure emotions. We will then report the full sequence of events that
characterized the experiment.
Methods
Elicitation of risk preferences Risk attitudes were elicited using lotteries (as in Hey
2001). The subjects were presented with 100 pairwise choice problems between two
different lotteries. They had to indicate whether they preferred the left-hand side lottery
or the right-hand side lottery by pressing the corresponding button.8 Lotteries were
presented as segmented circles on the computer screen.9
All the 100 problems involved probabilities that were multiples of one-eighth, and
subjects were informed about this (the probabilities that we used are listed in Table 7 in
Hey 2001). There were four possible outcomes: €0, €8, €16 and €24. These amounts were
chosen to make the incentives offered by the main experimental task appropriate, given
the time needed to complete it. Each lottery included at least one and at most three of
these four outcomes.
Emotion inductionWe induced emotions by following procedures similar to those used
in prior studies (e.g. Lerner et al. 2004; Gino and Schweitzer 2008). Participants were
randomly assigned to one of five treatments—a joviality treatment, a sadness treatment,
a fear treatment, an anger treatment or a neutral treatment—and were shown one of five
different film clips (all tested on Germans by Hewig et al. 2005). Table 1 reports, for each
treatment, the film from which the clip was taken and a short description of the clip
watched by the participants. Each clip lasted less than 4 minutes.
Emotion measure To measure participants’ emotions, we used the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X, Watson and Clark 1999; validated German
translation: Krohne et al. 1996).10 This psychometric scale contains 60 items, which
describe different feelings and emotions. The 60 items can be compressed into two
general (positive and negative affect), or eleven basic emotion scales.11 All the 60 different
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emotion items appeared on the same screen, but their order was randomized across
subjects. The participants were asked to rate the extent to which they presently felt each
emotion item on a 5-point scale. The response scale ranged from 1 (very slightly or not at
all) to 5 (extremely).
As a further check on the strength of the induction, we included a question at the end
of the experiment explicitly asking participants whether the film clip made them feel
happier, sadder, angrier or more fearful, or whether they did not feel any of these
emotions. Our data analysis will focus on those participants for whom the emotion
induction did work satisfactorily, that is, who reported having experienced the emotion
that the film was supposed to arouse.
Experimental procedures
The full sequence of events, in all sessions and all treatments, unfolded as follows.
On entering the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to visually isolated
computer terminals. Then all participants received written instructions informing them
that the experiment included two parts. To mitigate potential demand effects,
participants were immediately given only the instructions for Part 1. The instructions for
Part 2 were distributed after all participants completed Part 1, and did not mention that
the PANAS-X questionnaire had to be answered once again.12
At the beginning of Part 1, we measured participants’ baseline affect. Participants
were instructed to read the list of 60 adjective descriptors of emotions from the PANAS-
X, and to indicate the extent to which the adjectives described their current affective state
on a 5-point scale. After completing the PANAS-X questionnaire, participants were
asked to express their preferences for each of 100 pairwise lotteries (Hey 2001), as
explained above.
Next, the instructions for Part 2 were distributed. The participants were informed
that, before starting the second part, they had to watch a film clip. Each participant was
asked to put on a headset and to press a ‘start’ button on the computer. By doing so, they
would launch one of five film clips, depending on the experimental treatment. Prior to
watching the film clips, the participants were urged to: (i) clear their mind of all thoughts,
feelings, and memories; (ii) become involved in the feelings suggested by the situations in
the film clip; and (iii) keep these feelings in mind for the remainder of the experiment.
These instructions were provided to make the emotion induction effects more intense,
TABLE 1
CLIPS SHOWN TO THE PARTICIPANTS IN EACH TREATMENT
Treatment Film title Description of the clip
Joviality When Harry met Sally Harry and Sally discuss whether Harry would notice
that a woman fakes an orgasm.
Sadness The Champ A boxer is lying severely injured on a table when his
son enters and sees him dying.
Fear The Silence of the Lambs A woman follows a dangerous killer into a basement.
Anger My Bodyguard A young man is attacked and beaten up by a group of
older pupils.
Control/Neutral All the President’s Men Two men are talking to each other in a courtroom.
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without exposing the design to the risk of undetectable experimenter demand effects
thanks to the presence of the neutral treatment (Westermann et al. 1996).
Immediately after viewing the clips, participants were presented with the same 100
lottery pairs as in Part 1, and asked to indicate their preferred lottery in each pair. The
presentation of the lotteries, as well as their left–right positioning, was randomized across
parts. After completing this task, participants completed once again the PANAS-X
questionnaire, which included the same list of 60 emotions as in Part 1 but in a
randomized order to avoid monotonous responses. The emotion manipulation check was
included in Part 2 after the main experimental task because we wanted to measure risk
attitudes immediately after the target emotion had been manipulated.
Finally, participants were administered a post-experimental questionnaire asking
them about (i) demographic characteristics (age, gender and field of study), (ii)
participation in previous experiments, (iii) whether or not they had already watched the
clip, and (iv) the way the watched clip made them feel.
The design choice of measuring emotions after eliciting risk preferences in Part 2
comes with a cost: as emotions are generally considered to be short-lived affective
states,13 there is a possibility that their effect fades away before the end of the risk
preference elicitation task, and thus before Part 2’s emotion manipulation check. To
account for this possibility, we include in our analysis only the participants who reported
to have felt the intended emotion. We can therefore be certain that the manipulated
emotions lasted long enough to eventually affect risk attitudes. It may be argued that the
risk elicitation task (rather than the film exposure) could induce the emotions measured
in Part 2. Yet this is highly unlikely because the risk elicitation task was identical across
all five treatments. Thus if it were responsible for emotion generation, then we should not
observe participants reporting the emotion that the film clip is supposed to evoke, which
instead we observe.14
In order to prompt participants to truthfully report their preferred lottery, we used
the random lottery incentive mechanism.15 The subjects were informed that at the end of
the session, a randomly selected participant would draw a ball from an urn containing
two balls, labelled 1 and 2, and that the number on the drawn ball would determine the
payoff-relevant part. Then, to pick a problem from the selected part, the same participant
had to draw a ticket from an opaque bag containing 100 tickets, numbered 1–100. Each
participant was reminded of the choice that she made in the selected problem, played out
the preferred lottery for real (using an eight-sided die), and was paid accordingly.
It has been argued that the random lottery incentive mechanism might not elicit true
preferences if the subjects are not expected utility maximizers in the sense that they
violate the independence axiom (e.g. Holt 1986). However, previous experimental studies
indicate that subjects separate each decision task and do not consider the experiment as a
single decision problem (Starmer and Sugden 1991; Cubitt et al. 1998; Hey and Lee
2005). If this holds, then the random lottery incentive mechanism elicits true preferences
even when testing non-expected utility theories, as we do here.16 A further caveat is that
the random lottery design may cause incentives to be diluted by the fact that each
problem has a small probability of being selected and played out for real (Harrison
1994). Hence expected earnings may become negligible. As emphasized above, we
selected the possible lottery outcomes to provide appropriate incentives and to minimize
this problem: expected earnings from the risk elicitation task were indeed €11.50, and
subjects took approximately 40 minutes to answer the 200 questions. These expected
earnings are more than a local student assistant’s hourly compensation (namely, €8). It
remains true that the cost of ‘misbehaviour’ (i.e. the foregone expected income of a false
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report) is small and equal to €0.01 if we multiply the cost of a false report (i.e. the
difference in expected values between the left and right lotteries) at any choice question
by the probability of that question being selected for payment, which is 1 in 200. Yet if
subjects separate out the individual questions and consider each question in isolation
from all the others (as Hey and Lee 2005, among others, show), then the cost of
misbehaviour is €2.43, which is far from being negligible. Moreover, Wilcox (1993) and
Beattie and Loomes (1997) provide experimental evidence that subjects’ unwillingness to
apply the cognitive effort required to identify their truly preferred option is a minor
worry in the case of simple pairwise choice problems like those that we use here.17
Overall, we ran twelve sessions with a total of 300 participants. Each session lasted
less than 2 hours, including distribution and reading of the instructions as well as
payment of money. The average payoff was about €20.00 (inclusive of a show-up fee of
€7.50), ranging from a minimum of €7.50 to a maximum of €31.50.
II. THE ECONOMETRIC MODEL
In round t, let us consider a choice problem involving two lotteries, Xt and Yt. Each
lottery comprises, at most, three out of four outcomes. Let us denote the four outcomes
of lottery Xt, for all t, in ascending order, as x1, x2, x3, x4, occurring with probabilities p1t,
p2t, p3t, p4t, respectively, with p1t + p2t + p3t + p4t = 1. Similarly, let us denote the four
outcomes of lottery Yt, for all t, as y1, y2, y3, y4, occurring with probabilities q1t, q2t, q3t,
q4t, respectively, with q1t + q2t + q3t + q4t = 1.
18
Let ui(z) be a utility function, with z being the lottery outcome. We normalize so that
ui(0) = 0 and ui(max(z)) = 1, where max(z) is the largest possible outcome, that is, x4 or
y4, which equals €24. In the absence of error, subject i evaluates the two lotteries Xt and
Yt as
Viðx1; p1t; x2; p2t; x3; p3t; x4; p4tÞ ¼ Pi2tuiðx2Þ þ Pi3tuiðx3Þ þ Pi4t;ð1Þ
Viðy1; q1t; y2; q2t; y3; q3t; y4; q4tÞ ¼ Qi2tuiðy2Þ þQi3tuiðy3Þ þQi4t;ð2Þ
where the Pi and Qi are transformations of the true probabilities.
As a utility function we adopt the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) functional
form uiðzÞ ¼ ðz=maxðzÞÞai . The parameter ai [ 0 is less than 1 for risk-averse agents,
equal to 1 for risk-neutral agents, and greater than 1 for risk-loving agents.
The Pi and Qi correspond to the true probabilities in the following way:
Ri2t ¼ wiðr2t þ r3t þ r4tÞ  wiðr3t þ r4tÞ;
Ri3t ¼ wiðr3t þ r4tÞ  wiðr4tÞ;
Ri4t ¼ wiðr4tÞ;
where wi(r) is a probability weighting function of the true probability r.
We test different alternative functional forms for wi(r), which can be either linear or
non-linear. If the weighting function is linear, that is, wi(r) = r, then subjects follow the
expected utility theory (EU). If it is non-linear, then subjects follow the rank dependent
expected utility theory (RDEU).
As alternative specifications of the weighting function wi(r), we use:
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• Kahneman and Tversky: wiðrÞ ¼ rciðrci þð1rÞci Þ1=ci ;
• Power: wiðrÞ ¼ rci ;
• Prelec: wiðrÞ ¼ exp½ð lnðrÞÞci .
In each specification, the parameter ci [ 0 determines the shape of the weighting
function. In all cases, when ci ¼ 1, there is no probability distortion, and the model
reduces to the EU model.
The first weighting function goes back to Kahneman and Tversky (1979). When
0\ ci\ 1, the probability weighting function assumes an inverse-S shape. When ci [ 1,
it takes on an S-shape.
The second specification consists of a concave function when 0\ ci\ 1, while it
assumes a convex form when ci [ 1.
The third functional form was introduced by Prelec (1998). As ci ! 0, wi(r) becomes
a step function that is flat everywhere except at the edges of the probability interval.
Similarly to the Kahneman and Tversky specification, the probability weighting function
is inverse-S shaped when 0\ ci\ 1, and S-shaped when ci [ 1.
In detail, the distributional assumptions of the parameters characterizing the EU
model are
lnðaiÞNðla; r2aÞ; ci ¼ 1:
The log-normal density function evaluated at a will be denoted as f(a; la, ra).
In the RDEU case, the distributional assumptions about the parameters of the model
are
lnðaiÞ
lnðciÞ
 
N lalc
 
;
r2a qrarc
qrarc r
2
c
  
:
The bivariate log-normal density function evaluated at (a, c) will be denoted as g(a, c; la,
ra, lc, rc, q). The parameter ai in the EU model and the parameters ai and ci in the
RDEU model represent the unobserved heterogeneity, that is, the individual-specific
effects.19 Subjects are generally noisy when they choose. To capture this, we assume that
they evaluate the difference in the lotteries in each pairwise choice problem with error ɛt,
known as ‘Fechner error’, that we assume to be distributed asNð0; r2e Þ, so that the subject
chooses Xt (Yt) if and only if
20
Vxt  Vyt þ et[ ð\Þ0;
where Vxt and Vyt represent equations (1) and (2), respectively.
Let us use the binary variable dt = 1(1) to indicate that the subject chooses Xt (Yt)
in choice problem t. Then the likelihood contribution of a single subject’s choice in
problem t, according to the EU theory, is
Pðdtja; c ¼ 1; reÞ ¼ U dtðVxt  VytÞ=re
 
; dt 2 f1;1g;
where Φ[] is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Similarly, the
likelihood contribution of a single subject’s choice in problem t, according to the RDEU
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theory, is
Pðdtja; c; reÞ ¼ U dtðVxt  VytÞ=re
 
; dt 2 f1;1g:
Considering the 100 choice problems that each subject faces in both parts of the
experiment altogether, and integrating out the unobserved heterogeneity, we get the
individual likelihood contribution under the EU theory:
Lðla; ra; reÞ ¼
Z 1
0
Y100
t¼1
Pðdtja; c ¼ 1; reÞ
" #
fða; la; raÞda:ð3Þ
The individual likelihood contribution under the RDEU theory is, instead,
Lðla; ra; lc; rc; q; reÞ ¼
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Y100
t¼1
Pðdtja; c; reÞ
" #
gða; c; la; ra; lc; rc; qÞdadc:ð4Þ
In order to capture the effect of emotions on the mean of the population, in Part 2, we
allow la in the EU case and both la and lc in the RDEU case to depend linearly on
treatment dummies.
The sample log-likelihood for all subjects is the sum of the logarithms of L given by
equations (3) and (4) over all subjects. The models are estimated by maximum simulated
likelihood. In order to integrate out the parameters a in equation (3) and a and c in
equation (4), we use sequences of 100 (shuffled) Halton draws.21
III. RESULTS
The analysis that follows is performed on the data collected from 171 participants, that
is, all those who declared to have felt the appropriate target emotion.22 Before presenting
the main results of the study, we check the validity of the random assignment assumption
and verify that our experimental manipulation successfully induced the desired emotional
states, according to the PANAS-X data.
Demographic characteristics
We begin our analysis by verifying that the random assignment of students to treatments
was effective. This check is important because it has been shown that risk attitudes
depend on some personal characteristics such as gender and age (see, for example,
Dohmen et al. 2011 and references therein).
Table 2 presents the demographics of our sample and the participations in previous
experiments for each treatment. About three-fifths of the participants are female, ranging
from 60% in the joviality treatment to 77% in the sadness treatment. The average age is
around 22, which is not surprising given that subjects are recruited from the
undergraduate student population. Approximately one-third of our subjects are enrolled
in social science courses, and only a few of them study either business administration or
economics. Finally, the rate of participation in previous experiments is rather
homogeneous across treatments. According to a series of Kruskal–Wallis (KW) rank-
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sum tests, there are no significant differences in any of the individual characteristics
across treatments (p-values equal to 0.581, 0.579, 0.774, and 0.461 for gender, age, major
of study and number of previous experiments, respectively). The random assignment
assumption cannot therefore be rejected.23
Emotions manipulation check
To avoid revealing our interest in specific emotions, we included all 60 affective items
listed in the PANAS-X questionnaire, although only 25 are of interest. The joviality
factor includes ‘cheerful’, ‘delighted’, ‘happy’, ‘joyful’, ‘excited’, ‘lively’, ‘enthusiastic’
and ‘energetic’ (Cronbach’s a ≥ 0.90 in both parts of the experiment). The sadness factor
includes ‘sad’, ‘blue’, ‘alone’, ‘lonely’ and ‘downhearted’ (a ≥ 0.77 in both parts). The fear
factor includes ‘afraid’, ‘shaky’, ‘nervous’, ‘jittery’, ‘scared’ and ‘frightened’ (a ≥ 0.78 in
both parts). Finally, the anger factor includes ‘disgusted’, ‘scornful’, ‘irritable’, ‘angry’,
‘hostile’ and ‘loathing’ (a ≥ 0.76 in both parts). All factors display a good level of internal
consistency reliability.24
To analyse emotions data and to exploit the within-subject design, we proceed as
follows. First, we create 25 indicator variables, one for each of the 25 aforementioned
items. Each indicator takes value 1 if the participant rates the corresponding item higher
in the second part of the experiment (after the emotion manipulation) than in the first
part, 0 otherwise. Once we have coded (as 0 or 1) each individual item, we proceed to the
second step. For each subject, we aggregate the indicator variables into four emotional
classes, each containing the items specified above. We aggregate by summing the
TABLE 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS BY TREATMENT
Treatment
Joviality Sadness Fear Anger Neutral
Subjects 48 31 25 18 49
Female 0.60 0.77 0.64 0.67 0.61
Age 22.00 21.84 22.20 22.22 23.18
Major of study:
Business administration 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.11
Economics 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.00
Engineering 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06
Law 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.10
Medicine 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.06
Sciences 0.10 0.16 0.28 0.11 0.19
Social sciences 0.44 0.42 0.20 0.39 0.27
Arts and Humanities 0.13 0.16 0.24 0.06 0.12
Other fields 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.17 0.10
Number of experiments:
None 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02
Less than 4 0.21 0.19 0.40 0.11 0.16
Between 4 and 8 0.48 0.55 0.44 0.56 0.59
More than 8 0.25 0.26 0.16 0.28 0.23
Notes
Relative frequencies for gender, major of study and number of experiments; means for age.
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indicator variables that refer to the items in the same emotion. Taking, for example,
‘joviality’, which is made up of 8 items, each subject’s aggregate indicator variable for
joviality can range from 0 (if the subject rates no item higher in Part 2) to 8 (if the subject
assigns a higher score to all 8 items in Part 2). For each emotion, we can thus construct a
vector with length equal to the number of subjects in each treatment, whose components
indicate how many items a subject rates higher in Part 2.25 The vectors so obtained
identify the joviality, sadness, fear and anger factors that we compare across treatments
and within each treatment. The across-treatment comparisons enable us to check
whether a specific emotion is more present in the corresponding treatment than in the
other treatments. The within-treatment comparisons reveal whether the right emotion
has been induced in a specific treatment.
Summary statistics of the emotional factors are reported in Table 3, separately for
each treatment. On average, participants in the joviality treatment assign a higher score
to 2.02 items of the joviality factor in Part 2. Participants in the other treatments increase
the rating of fewer items of the joviality factor; the difference across treatments is
statistically significant according to a Kruskal–Wallis (KW) rank-sum test (p-value
0.0004). Moreover, in the joviality treatment, following the emotion induction, more
items are rated higher for the joviality factor than for any other emotional factor (one-
sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests comparing the joviality factor with each one of the
other emotional factors, all p-values ≤0.001). We take this as an indication that When
Harry met Sally successfully induced joviality.
Turning to our manipulation of negative emotions, The Champ leads participants in
the sadness treatment to increase the score of 1.94 items of the sadness factor, on average.
This is significantly more than the number of items of the sadness factor that are rated
higher in all the other treatments (KW 29.35, p-value 0.0001). After watching the film
clip, more items of the fear factor (2 on average) are rated higher in the fear treatment
than in any other treatment (KW 23.79, p-value 0.0001). In Part 2 of the anger treatment,
we obtain a similar result. In particular, a larger number of items of the anger factor (2
on average) are rated higher in the anger treatment than in any other treatment (KW
19.37, p-value 0.001).26 Within-treatment comparisons show that participants in the
sadness, fear and anger treatments increase the score of more items of the manipulated
emotion than of any other emotion. According to a series of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests,
in each treatment there are significantly more increased items for the manipulated
emotion than for the other emotions; the difference is significant at the 5% level in almost
all comparisons, except for (i) the comparisons between the sadness factor and the fear
factor in the sadness treatment, and between the anger factor and the sadness factor in
TABLE 3
EMOTIONAL FACTORS BY TREATMENT
Factor
Treatment
Joviality Sadness Fear Anger Neutral
Joviality 2.02 (1.76) 1.03 (1.22) 1.08 (1.50) 0.61 (0.61) 1.92 (1.55)
Sadness 0.44 (0.94) 1.94 (1.61) 1.00 (1.04) 1.22 (1.44) 0.57 (0.84)
Fear 1.06 (1.26) 1.48 (1.29) 2.00 (1.47) 1.56 (1.42) 0.63 (0.88)
Anger 0.54 (1.13) 0.74 (1.00) 0.96 (1.10) 2.00 (2.09) 0.29 (0.54)
Notes
Average number of items that are rated higher after the emotion manipulation by emotional factor and
treatment. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
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the anger treatment, which are significant at the 10% level, and (ii) the comparison
between the anger factor and the fear factor in the anger treatment, which is not
significant. Based on these findings and on the restriction of our sample to those who
declared to have felt the appropriate emotion, we are confident about the efficacy of our
negative emotion induction.
Risk preferences
Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the four preference functionals
described in Section II. The models, which are estimated with a Fechner error term,27 are
displayed in the following order: EU, RDEU with the Kahneman and Tversky (KT)
specification of the weighting function, RDEU with the Power specification, RDEU with
the Prelec specification. For each model, there are two columns of estimated coefficients,
labelled ‘Part 1’ and ‘Part 2’. Part 1 (Part 2) indicates that the model has been fitted on
the 100 choices faced before (after) stimulating subjects’ emotions. Part 1 data are
estimated without distinguishing between emotions because emotions are manipulated at
the end of the first part. Part 2 data are estimated, instead, allowing the means of the
relevant coefficients (la in the EU case, and both la and lc in the RDEU cases) to vary
with the treatment. In Part 2, the constant represents the mean estimated from the
control treatment (with no emotion elicitation), while the estimated coefficients on the
treatment dummies are deviations from the control attributable to the effect of emotions.
According to the likelihood ratio test, each of the estimated RDEU models fits better
than the EU model, for both Part 1 and Part 2 data. We can thus focus only on the
alternative specifications of the RDEU model. Since all the considered specifications
have the same number of parameters, any criterion of the AIC or BIC type would apply
the same penalization factor to all of them. What matters, when all is said and done, is
the log-likelihood of the fits. According to such a measure, the RDEU specification that
fits the data best is RDEU/Power for both Part 1 and Part 2. Consequently, we will
concentrate the following discussion on this specification, which applies a monotonically
increasing or decreasing weight on probabilities.
For the chosen specification, three remarks are in order. First, the variability is
considerable for both la and lc: although rc significantly reduces in Part 2 compared to
Part 1, it still accounts for a large amount of heterogeneity across subjects. Second, the
correlation coefficient q is estimated to be positive, statistically significant, and quite
significant (it is around 0.30 in both Part 1 and Part 2). The implication of this finding is
rather interesting. This is telling us that those who have a small a tend also to have a
small c, and vice versa. In other words, the more risk-averse people are, the more they
tend to overweight large outcomes. Third, the standard deviation of the Fechner error
term, rɛ, is rather small in both parts (≤0.057). These error values are consistent with
those observed in previous empirical studies.28
Although the estimated parameters of the underlying bivariate normal distribution of a
and c, reported in Table 4, provide information about whether there is a change in the
coefficients of the treatment dummies compared to the control, to determine whether
emotions affect risk attitudes, we consider the means of a and c, which follow a bivariate
log-normal distribution and are derived from Table 4’s estimated parameters in the
following way: the mean of a equals expðla þ r2a=2Þ, and the mean of c equals
expðlc þ r2c=2Þ. These means have the great advantage of allowing an immediate
interpretation. As a matter of fact, when the mean of the risk attitude coefficient a is lower
(greater) than 1, people are risk-averse (risk-seeking); when a is equal to 1, they are risk-
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neutral. As to the mean of the (Power) weighting function parameter, when c < 1, people
tend to overvalue (undervalue) the probability of the largest (smallest) outcome(s), whereas
when c > 1, people tend to underweight (overweight) the largest (smallest) outcome(s).
The ‘Parameters’ columns in Table 5 show the means of the log-normal distribution
of a and c for both Part 1 and Part 2. In line with the estimates in Table 4, Part 1 data
result in a single parameter, while Part 2 data comprise a parameter value for each of the
five treatments. The last column of Table 5 presents the p-values of Wald tests of
equality of the estimated parameters between (i) Part 1 and the neutral treatment, (ii)
each treatment dummy and the neutral treatment, and (iii) the different emotion
treatments. Comparison (i) allows us to verify whether there is a change in the means of
a and c between Part 1 and Part 2 due to, for example, experimenter demand effects or
whatever other reason not directly attributable to the emotion manipulation, like
subjects getting used to the choice task or subjects’ inconsistencies. The four pairwise
comparisons (ii) serve to demonstrate the effect of emotions on risk attitudes. The
pairwise comparisons (iii) enable us to detect any (statistically) significant difference in
risk preferences between the induced emotions.
TABLE 5
MEANS OF THE LOG-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARAMETERS OF INTEREST AND
RELATED TESTS—FULL SAMPLE
Parameters
Wald tests p-valuePart 1 Part 2
a 0.367
(0.020) Part 1 vs. Neutral 0.515
Neutral 0.349 Joviality vs. Neutral 0.045
(0.027) Sadness vs. Neutral 0.049
Joviality 0.425 Fear vs. Neutral 0.000
(0.028) Anger vs. Neutral 0.000
Sadness 0.444 Joviality vs. Sadness 0.718
(0.036) Joviality vs. Fear 0.000
Fear 0.653 Joviality vs. Anger 0.003
(0.058) Sadness vs. Fear 0.004
Anger 0.631 Sadness vs. Anger 0.011
(0.064) Fear vs. Anger 0.794
c 0.717
(0.027) Part 1 vs. Neutral 0.004
Neutral 1.018 Joviality vs. Neutral 0.035
(0.105) Sadness vs. Neutral 0.145
Joviality 1.282 Fear vs. Neutral 0.031
(0.087) Anger vs. Neutral 0.232
Sadness 1.218 Joviality vs. Sadness 0.548
(0.100) Joviality vs. Fear 0.657
Fear 1.343 Joviality vs. Anger 0.491
(0.119) Sadness vs. Fear 0.388
Anger 1.194 Sadness vs. Anger 0.857
(0.110) Fear vs. Anger 0.342
Notes
The number of observations is as in Table 4. The standard errors of the estimated parameters (reported in
parentheses) are obtained with the Delta method. All parameters are significant at the 1% level.
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The mean of the risk attitude parameter (a) does not change significantly between
Part 1 and the neutral treatment as it can be deduced by comparing the estimate of the
mean of a from Part 1 data with that from the neutral treatment data in Part 2 (0.367 vs.
0.349, p-value 0.515). This means that participants exposed to the neutral affect film do
not modify significantly their risk preferences compared to Part 1, thereby ensuring that
the within-subject design used in this study did not induce undesirable experimenter
demand effects. Conversely, the same comparison performed on the mean of the
weighting function parameter (c) indicates that there is a change between Part 1 and the
neutral treatment (0.717 vs. 1.018, p-value 0.004), implying that participants tend to
become less optimistic in Part 2.
Turning to the main purpose of the paper—that is, if and how emotions change risk
preferences—we can see that all the emotions significantly increase the mean of the risk
attitude parameter compared to the control (neutral) group (p-value ≤0.049 for all four
comparisons). This finding implies that joyful, sad, fearful and angry subjects tend to be
significantly less risk-averse than subjects in a neutral affective state. Furthermore, our
results show that compared to the neutral treatment, joviality and fear have some
influence on c (p-values 0.035 and 0.031, respectively).
A significant difference is also detected when we compare a between emotion
treatments, except for the comparisons between joviality and sadness (p-value 0.718) and
fear and anger (p-value 0.794). Thus compared to participants in the treatments inducing
joy and sadness, fearful and angry participants are significantly more prone to take risk.
It is worth noting that had we used any of the other specifications of the RDEU
models that we have considered, we would have reported different estimates and different
statistically significant effects of some emotions on the mean of the risk attitude
parameter. This highlights the importance of selecting the model that best represents the
data and might provide an explanation for the opposite effects that we can find in the
literature.
There is evidence that gender plays an important role in decision-making under risk.
In particular, women are generally found to be more risk-averse than men (see the review
on gender differences by Croson and Gneezy 2009). To verify whether the effects spotted
from the entire sample hold for both males and females, or whether emotions affect risk
attitudes differently for men and women, we have divided the sample by gender.29 The
parameters estimated by the econometric models (RDEU/Power specification) are
reported in the first four columns of Table 6, separately for males and females. The
corresponding means of the log-normal distribution of a and c for the subsamples of
males and females and the related Wald tests are displayed in Table 7.
It turns out that the analysis is meaningful: gender differences show up. Specifically,
while sadness strongly increases male risk aversion (p-value 0.013), joviality has a
significant impact on female risk attitudes only (p-value 0.004). Fear increases both male
(p-value 0.025) and female (p-value 0.006) risk attitudes. Anger, on the other hand, does
not significantly affect either male or female risk attitudes (p-values ≥ 0.277). Moreover,
in line with previous studies, females are estimated to be significantly more risk-averse
than males in both parts of the experiment (p-value ≤ 0.008 in both cases). Concerning
the weighting function parameter, we notice that whatever the gender, the estimate of the
mean of c from the neutral treatment data in Part 2 exceeds that from Part 1 data,
meaning that both males and females exhibit an increase in c from Part 1 to Part 2 of the
experiment. The increase is, however, significant only for females (p-value 0.000). Fearful
males and females experience an even bigger increase in the mean of the weighting
function parameter.
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The last four columns of Table 6 display the estimates of the RDEU/Power model
parameters obtained by dividing the sample according to subjects’ previous participation
in laboratory experiments. We refer to subjects who participated in at most 6 experiments
as inexperienced, and to subjects who took part in more than 6 experiments as
experienced.30 The corresponding means of a and c, as well as the related Wald tests, are
reported in Table 8.
Somewhat in line with our expectation that emotions would affect less the risk
preferences of the experienced, we find that joviality and fear lead only the inexperienced
to be significantly less risk-averse (at a significance level of 5%). As for c, whereas the
inexperienced’s weighting parameter is affected positively and weakly significantly by
sadness (p-value 0.079), the weighting parameter of the experienced is strongly
significantly influenced by anger (p-value 0.003).
TABLE 7
MEANS OF THE LOG-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARAMETERS OF INTEREST AND
RELATED TESTS—GENDER SUBSAMPLE
Parameters
Wald tests
Males Females p-value
Part 1 Part 2 Part 1 Part 2 Males Females
a 0.420 0.290
(0.023) (0.020) Part 1 vs. Neutral 0.198 0.960
Neutral 0.377 0.288 Joviality vs. Neutral 0.119 0.004
(0.034) (0.037) Sadness vs. Neutral 0.013 0.709
Joviality 0.458 0.465 Fear vs. Neutral 0.025 0.006
(0.040) (0.049) Anger vs. Neutral 0.396 0.277
Sadness 0.260 0.305 Joviality vs. Sadnes 0.000 0.003
(0.035) (0.026) Joviality vs. Fear 0.130 0.486
Fear 0.635 0.531 Joviality vs. Anger 0.860 0.043
(0.110) (0.080) Sadness vs. Fear 0.002 0.008
Anger 0.479 0.343 Sadness vs. Anger 0.062 0.360
(0.117) (0.034) Fear vs. Anger 0.347 0.032
c 0.994 0.682
(0.076) (0.044) Part 1 vs. Neutral 0.258 0.000
Neutral 1.097 1.552 Joviality vs. Neutral 0.557 0.717
(0.091) (0.232) Sadness vs. Neutral 0.087 0.685
Joviality 1.025 1.457 Fear vs. Neutral 0.065 0.068
(0.099) (0.226) Anger vs. Neutral 0.121 0.839
Sadness 0.878 1.645 Joviality vs. Sadness 0.284 0.358
(0.117) (0.169) Joviality vs. Fear 0.032 0.035
Fear 1.519 2.284 Joviality vs. Anger 0.057 0.846
(0.220) (0.397) Sadness vs. Fear 0.007 0.092
Anger 1.368 1.502 Sadness vs. Anger 0.005 0.436
(0.165) (0.136) Fear vs. Anger 0.567 0.049
Notes
The number of observations for males and females are as in Table 6. The standard errors of the estimated
parameters (reported in parentheses) are obtained with the Delta method. All parameters are significant at the
1% level.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Our study contributes to the literature on the role of emotions in decision-making under
risk. By means of an experiment providing participants with salient monetary incentives
and meeting state-of-the-art methodological criteria, we find that a positive emotion
(namely joviality) as well as three negative emotions (namely sadness, fear and anger)
lessen risk aversion. We obtained this result by estimating an econometric model that
controls for heterogeneity both within subjects and between subjects. We select the model
that fits the pooled data best from a set of four different specifications of the functional
form.
The finding that joyful participants are less risk-averse than participants in a neutral
affective state provides partial support for the affect infusion model (Forgas 1995),
asserting that individuals who are in a positive emotional state rely on positive cues when
making judgments, and thus tend to perceive a risky task as favourable. The affect
TABLE 8
MEANS OF THE LOG-NORMAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARAMETERS OF INTEREST AND
RELATED TESTS—EXPERIENCE SUBSAMPLE
Parameters
Wald tests
Inexperienced Experienced p-value
Part 1 Part 2 Part 1 Part 2 In. Ex.
a 0.388 0.343
(0.023) (0.019) Part 1 vs. Neutral 0.177 0.397
Neutral 0.327 0.371 Joviality vs. Neutral 0.047 0.099
(0.045) (0.032) Sadness vs. Neutral 0.227 0.473
Joviality 0.448 0.453 Fear vs. Neutral 0.003 0.570
(0.037) (0.039) Anger vs. Neutral 0.215 0.259
Sadness 0.405 0.335 Joviality vs. Sadness 0.368 0.036
(0.042) (0.040) Joviality vs. Fear 0.280 0.507
Fear 0.511 0.408 Joviality vs. Anger 0.386 0.801
(0.045) (0.058) Sadness vs. Fear 0.086 0.291
Anger 0.403 0.477 Sadness vs. Anger 0.975 0.142
(0.041) (0.090) Fear vs. Anger 0.076 0.507
c 0.702 0.095
(0.039) (0.065) Part 1 vs. Neutral 0.000 0.106
Neutral 1.500 1.552 Joviality vs. Neutral 0.991 0.762
(0.185) (0.153) Sadness vs. Neutral 0.079 0.385
Joviality 1.503 1.206 Fear vs. Neutral 0.808 0.956
(0.129) (0.115) Anger vs. Neutral 0.309 0.003
Sadness 1.982 0.993 Joviality vs. Sadness 0.026 0.121
(0.236) (0.099) Joviality vs. Fear 0.772 0.807
Fear 1.552 1.163 Joviality vs. Anger 0.160 0.006
(0.146) (0.148) Sadness vs. Fear 0.083 0.307
Anger 1.283 2.540 Sadness vs. Anger 0.002 0.002
(0.140) (0.462) Fear vs. Anger 0.129 0.006
Notes
The number of observations for inexperienced (‘In.’) and experienced (‘Ex.’) are as in Table 6. The standard
errors of the estimated parameters (reported in parentheses) are obtained with the Delta method. All parameters
are significant at the 1% level.
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infusion model is not fully supported by our data because it predicts that individuals who
are in a negative emotional state should behave in the opposite way and thus be more
likely to make conservative risky decisions.
We observe, instead, that sad, fearful and angry participants are more prone to take
risk compared to participants in a neutral affective state, therefore acting in line with the
mood maintenance hypothesis (Isen and Patrick 1983). The general claim of this
hypothesis is that the effect of mood on risk preferences can be explained through a desire
to maintain a positive affective state or to mitigate a negative one. Along this line of
reasoning, people experiencing negative emotions should be willing to take risk because
they hope to improve their state.
We focused on specific negative emotions, rather than on global negative and positive
affect, because previous studies (like, for example, Raghunathan and Pham 1999; Lerner
and Keltner 2001; Kugler et al. 2012) indicate that affective states of the same valence
can induce opposing risk attitudes. Remarkably, our results suggest otherwise: different
negative emotions have the same effect on risk-taking behaviour. This finding is,
however, consistent with the mood repair hypothesis, according to which people in
negative affective states are willing to make risky choices in order to obtain an outcome
that would make them feel happy.
Our data therefore show that positive and negative emotions involve separate
cognitive processes, so that different models are needed to explain their effect on risk
preferences. Joyful participants, who are in a positive emotional state, seem to be likely
to appraise the risk positively. Sad, fearful and angry participants, who are in a negative
emotional state, rather than behaving in an opposite way and evaluating the risk
negatively, appear to be willing to change this undesired state. After all, maintaining
negative affective states is probably not a goal for most people. Understanding the
reasons for the different cognitive mechanisms induced by negative and positive emotions
would enrich the picture painted here, but is beyond the scope of the current study.
We confirm the result (see, for example, Croson and Gneezy 2009) that females are
more risk-averse than males; in our sample, this holds true both before and after the
emotion manipulation. Moreover, in line with Fehr-Duda et al. (2011), we show the
existence of gender differences in the role of emotions in risk-taking behaviour. We find
that the male willingness to take risk is positively influenced by sadness, while only
joviality affects the female risk attitudes. Finally, our analysis of whether emotions
impact risk preferences differently depending on subjects’ previous laboratory experience
indicates that the only difference between experienced and inexperienced participants is
that the latter (but not the former) are affected by fear.
Our results are only partially consistent with previous research on emotions. This
inconsistency may be due to the method that we employed to identify and estimate risk
attitudes. Future research will have to assess the robustness of our findings using the
same econometric technique, but different sample pools and/or different emotions.
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NOTES
1. Economists commonly use the terms ‘affect’, ‘mood’ and ‘emotion’ as synonyms. Psychologists, instead,
tend to make clear distinctions among them. Robbins and Judge (2012, ch. 4, p. 98) define these terms as
follows: ‘Affect is a generic term that covers a broad range of feelings people experience, including both
emotions and moods. Emotions are intense feelings directed at someone or something. Moods are less
intense feelings than emotions and often (though not always) arise without a specific event acting as a
stimulus.’ We adhere to these meanings of the terms, and thus, since we use visual stimuli—namely film clips
—as induction procedure, we refer to emotions rather than moods. In doing so, we follow, for example,
Gross and Levenson (1995), Lerner et al. (2004), and Gino and Schweitzer (2008). We acknowledge,
however, that there are authors (such as Treffers et al. 2012) who prefer using the term ‘mood’ with an
induction procedure based on film clips. In this work, the terms ‘emotion’, ‘affective state’ and ‘emotional
state’ are used interchangeably.
2. Notable exceptions are Lee and Andrade (2011), van Winden et al. (2011) and Treffers et al. (2012).
3. As Friedman and Sunder (1994) point out, preferences toward risk are the most important characteristic
that economic theory recognizes to vary across individuals.
4. See, for instance, Treffers et al. (2012) or Drichoutis and Nayga (2013).
5. For advantages and pitfalls of MPLs, see also Charness et al. (2013).
6. The literature has proposed several alternative procedures to elicit emotions (e.g. images, sounds, self-
statements, distribution of cookies or candies, relived or imagined scenes, music, and odours). Film clips
have turned out to be one of the most powerful methods (Westermann et al. 1996; Lerner and Keltner
2001).
7. Lerner et al. (2003) study the emotional reaction to the 11 September terrorist attack, surveying members of
a nationally representative sample of Americans. They find that, compared to females, males express more
anger, less fear, and less pessimistic risk estimates, and that differences in reported emotions explain a large
part of the gender difference. Fessler et al. (2004) show that anger leads men (but not women) to make
riskier choices, whereas disgust leads women (but not men) to make less risky choices. Finally, Fehr-Duda
et al. (2011) find that women in a better than usual mood tend to weight probabilities more optimistically
(while men do not).
8. We did not allow the participants to indicate indifference. The reasons for doing so are outlined in Hey
(2001, p. 53).
9. Previous research has shown that colours can affect emotions, mood and feelings (e.g. Cimbalo et al. 1978;
Bellizzi and Hite 1992). Hence, in order not to confound our emotion manipulation, segmented circles were
displayed on the grey scale.
10. We use the German translation of the PANAS-X questionnaire provided by R€ocke and Gr€uhn (2003),
which is based on Krohne et al. (1996).
11. These emotions are fear, hostility, guilt, sadness, joviality, self-assurance, attentiveness, shyness, fatigue,
serenity and surprise.
12. An English translation of the instructions can be found in the Online Appendix.
13. While most of those who distinguish emotions from moods maintain that moods endure longer, there is no
agreement about the duration of emotions. Some authors suggest that emotions last a matter of minutes,
sometimes even seconds (e.g. Ekman 2004). Others argue that most emotions persist for about an hour (e.g.
Frijda 2007).
14. See, for example, Gino and Schweitzer (2008) for an experiment where emotion manipulation checks were
included after the main dependent variable, namely the extent to which participants rely on advice.
15. Such a payoff mechanism avoids wealth and portfolio effects that may emerge if subjects are paid for all
decisions either sequentially or at the end of the experiment.
16. Cox et al. (2015) and Harrison and Swarthout (2014) recently reopened the debate on the random lottery
incentive mechanism. Cox et al. (2015) show that the only incentive-compatible mechanism under all
possible utility specifications is the one task (OT) mechanism, in which each subject responds to—and is
paid for—one choice task. Since ‘OT allows only for tests of hypotheses using between-subjects data’ (Cox
et al. 2015, p. 224), it could not be applied to our experiment that intended to use a within-subject design.
Additionally, had we considered the possibility of implementing the OT mechanism, this would have
required a massive sample size to reach acceptable levels of power and to guarantee random assignment to
treatments (Harrison and Swarthout 2014).
17. In a recent article, Drichoutis et al. (2015) manipulate the exchange rate between experimental currency and
cash using a private, induced-value second price auction. Their results indicate that the cost of misbehaviour
increases with higher induced values. Applied to our setting (where euros, rather than fictitious
experimental currencies, are used), this suggests that the relatively large expected earnings, in comparison to
a typical student hourly wage, may increase the perceived cost of misbehaviour and the cognitive effort
required to make a truthful decision.
18. Recall that in our experiment, x1 ¼ y1 ¼ €0, x2 ¼ y2 ¼ €8, x3 ¼ y3 ¼ €16 and x4 ¼ y4 ¼ €24.
19. A peculiar aspect of this approach, which is similar to that used by Botti et al. (2008), is that the distribution
of the parameter that shapes the weighting function of the RDEU model includes values of that parameter
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that are statistically indistinguishable from 1 (the case in which the RDEU models collapses to the EU
model), and in this sense the RDEUmodel is capable of including both RDEU and EU subjects.
20. From now on, having already made clear which components of the model will be treated as individual-
specific, we suppress the subscript i.
21. For details on both maximum simulated likelihood techniques and Halton sequences, see Train (2003).
22. We elected to follow a conservative approach (see, for example, Ugazio et al. 2012) and excluded from the
sample participants who did not show the expected affective response to the manipulation. For instance,
about 30% of the participants in the anger treatment—who watched the film clip from My Bodyguard—
declared that the clip made them feel sadder rather than angrier. Such participants are not included in the
data analysis.
23. The demographics of the full set of participants (including those for whom the emotion induction did not
work satisfactorily) mirror those of the considered sample. Also, for the full set of observations we do not
detect significant differences in gender, age, major of study and number of previous experiments across
treatments (p-values are, respectively, 0.301, 0.745, 0.123, and 0.224; KW tests). This reassures us that the
failure to reject the null hypothesis of no difference between treatments in our reduced sample is not due to
its small size (which may determine a low power of the test). Hence we can safely assume that the result of
the test for subjects’ random assignment to treatments is not due to a type II error.
24. Further details on the construction of the joviality, sadness, fear and anger factors can be found in Watson
and Clark (1999). In some sessions, due to a bug in the software, an item for each subject was recorded as a
missing value. To undertake a conservative approach, the missing data were treated as zeros.
25. This approach to Likert-scale data preserves the ordinal attributes of the items. Alternative approaches
(such as taking, for each item, the difference between Part 1 and Part 2 and then, for each subject, summing
these differences for the items in the same emotion) may be seen as more informative. Yet they presume that
the intervals between Likert values are equal and give a cardinal interpretation to the scores. For a
discussion on the appropriateness of treating Likert responses as absolute (cardinal) measures, see, for
example, Jamieson (2004) or Dittrich et al. (2007).
26. All results remain qualitatively the same when one-way ANOVA tests, rather than KW tests, are used. All
reported KW tests involve the neutral treatment. Excluding it, the KW p-values are 0.0032 for joviality,
0.0001 for sadness, 0.0247 for fear, and 0.0032 for anger. These results further confirm that the emotion
manipulation was successful.
27. Given the relevance of stochastic errors discussed, among others, by Hey (2005) and Loomes (2005), we
have also fitted all the specifications under several different modelling approaches, which include (alone and
in combination) the contextual utility error specification, introduced by Wilcox (2008, 2011), the strict
utility model proposed by Luce (1959), and mixture models with an expected utility and a rank dependent
component a la Harrison and Rutstr€om (2009). For a recent and comprehensive discussion of the relevant
literature on the tested stochastic error specifications and relative modelling details, the reader is referred to
Drichoutis and Lusk (2014) and references therein. Here, we have reported only the econometric models
and the results from the specification that appears to perform best on our data. Further details are available
on request.
28. The maximum likelihood estimates of the preference functionals do not depend on having considered only
the 171 subjects who declared to have felt the target emotion. Had we used the observations collected from
all 300 subjects, the results would have remained qualitatively unaltered.
29. Had we used a gender dummy and interacted it with all the variables, we would have obtained the same
results but the estimated coefficients would have been harder to interpret because of the presence of a large
number of interaction coefficients. Additionally, by estimating separate models for males and females, we
allow the dispersion of the parameters of interest not to be the same for both subsamples, providing more
accurate sample-specific results. The same arguments hold when we split the sample according to subjects’
experience.
30. The threshold was set to 6 in order to obtain groups of similar sizes, that is, 6 is the median participation in
previous experiments.
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